Monday 8 December 2014

A2 ethics: 'humans do not have moral responsibility.'

'Humans do not have moral responsibility.' Discuss. (35)


This essay was done under timed conditions, and given 31/35. (Teacher's comments in red.)


The answer to whether humans have moral responsibility is reliant upon whether humans have free will. This is because if we have free will, as stated by libertarianism, we are free to choose our actions and therefore have complete moral responsibility, whereas determinism would argue the opposite - if all of our actions have been determined, then it would be unfair to hold us responsible for them. Clarence Darrow was an American lawyer who was able to show the strength of the determinism argument, saving the murderers of a 14-year-old boy from the death penalty. He argued that the murder was purely ingrained within the boys' nature, and therefore they had no control of their actions. This forms the basis of hard determinism, and provides a very strong, and empirically provable, case in support of the fact that we shouldn't be held morally responsible for our actions. "Great start."

Hard determinism states that everything we do is the result of a chain of cause and effect that goes back into infinite regress. Every decision we make has been caused by external factors, and we have no control over this. Spinoza stated there is "no absolute free will", and Darrow agreed, stating "we are in the hands of nature". The justification behind this argument fundamentally lies with physics - we see from Newtonian physics that everything in the universe is affected by cause and effect, so why should human behaviour be any different? We can see this is true of behaviour in animals from Pavlov and Skinner's psychological experiments, supporting behaviourism. The fact that Pavlov was able to show classical conditioning take place is clear empirical evidence that behaviour can ultimately be controlled by stimuli, and if we are able to manipulate the stimuli, we can control behaviour. John Watson developed this point in relation to humans, suggesting that if he was given a set of infants, he would be able to control their environment to the extent that he would be able to mold them into specialists/professions of his choosing. If we are to accept behaviourist theories when considering moral decision-making, it seems very logical to suggest that our decisions have been influenced by external factors, not only from conditioning and society, but Pinker also puts forward the concept of biological determinism, stating that our behaviour is influenced and even controlled by our genes. All of this evidence comes together to support the determinist viewpoint that there are so many factors that influence and control our behaviour that we really do not have any say in what we do. Therefore we cannot be held morally responsible. This argument is strong due to having so much empirical evidence in the form of psychological experiments and scientific laws, therefore is one commonly held. However, there is a question as to whether scientific evidence is really appropriate when considering an issue such as free will. If free will did exist, it would be metaphysical, and as with any other metaphysical concept, we would not be able to empirically prove it to be true. "Good AO2".

Libertarianism, on the other end of the spectrum, uses this to criticise hard determinism, and instead puts forward an argument for free will that is much more appealing to our intuitions. Libertarianism states that we do have free will, and therefore should be held completely morally responsible for our actions. Libertarians deny that causation should apply to human behaviour. Instead, we are completely free to choose what we want. While there is no empirical evidence for this, there is some support in the fact that we feel guilt and regret when we do something wrong. These feelings suggest that we had the option to do something else, but we didn't. The fact that we had that choice means that free will must be true to an extent. If this is true, then we should accept full mroal responsibility for our actions, as there is nothing to blame other than ourselves for the decisions that we make.

However, it is highly unlikely that we can ever make a decision that is completely free, with no external influences. For this reason, the position of soft determinism seems much more probable, stating that determinism and libertarianism are not only compatible, but also necessary aspects of one another in order to be comprehensible. Compatibilism recognises that determinism does not necessarily rule out free will, therefore it could be very possible that we have free will within choices that have already been constrained. As stated by Schopenhauer, "man does what he wills, but cannot will what he wills", suggesting that while our choices may have been determined, we still have the ability to make out own decision within these choices. For this reason, compatibilism states that we still have an element of free will, therefore can be held morally responsible, to an extent. Hume states that free will is the "absence of constraint", so we are free unless physically constrained. This then has the implication of us being morally responsible unless we are physically unable to choose. For example, an example used by Ayer explained that kleptomaniacs are compelled to steal, meaning even if they choose not to, their physical instincts would take over and they would steal anyway. A compatibilist would not say that the kleptomaniac should be held responsible, as though they had free will, they were not actually free to carry out their decision, just as someone who can't swim shouldn't be held responsible for not saving a drowning child.

While compatibilism is also difficult to prove empirically, Ayer took a different approach to justifying soft determinism. He believed that by definition, we must have free will due to the possibility of us having an option. He stated that while out actions may be determined, we are free "just in case if we wanted to do otherwise, we would have". For this reason, he stated that the statement "I have free will" is tautologous, and therefore just as analytically true as the statement "all bachelors are unmarried men". Compatibilism is also very strong in the way that it adopts both the strengths of hard determinism and libertarianism. It accepts the principle of causation and therefore the empirically-proven behaviourism, while also appealing to our intuitions of being able to freely make decisions. However, compatibilism is a very convenient middle ground between hard determinism and libertarianism. It aims to merge two very different positions, and it seems unlikely that they can both be true.

However on balance, I feel compatibilism is still the strongest position. It takes into account that humans are definitely determined by external factors, but recognise that we still have the ability to make decisions, as Searle stated, "there is a clear gap between having reason to do something and actually doing it." Therefore it can be said that we should be morally responsible for our actions, as long as we are physically free to have a choice, and not physically constrained.


Mark/comment:

AO1: 20/21, AO2: 11/14, so overall: 31/35 - A+

"Brilliant! Almost a model essay - the only weakness being that your line of argument is only apparent in the 2nd half of the essay. Otherwise, v. well done."







A2 philo: 'life after death is impossible.' discuss.

‘Critically assess the view that life after death is impossible.’ (35)


This essay was given 32/35 - A*.


There is much conflict concerning whether life after death is possible, but the idea that is impossible is commonly put forward by monist or materialist philosophers, including Ryle, Pinker and Dawkins. If the above statement (that life after death is impossible) is accepted, this brings with it several implications to philosophy and religion as a whole. Not only will all dualist theories have to be rejected, due to the rejection of the soul being immortal and living on beyond death, but religion as a whole should be abolished. If life after death is impossible, then so is the entire metaphysical and spiritual world that is a fundamental basis for all religion, including the existence of a God or other higher being. Without these, religion no longer has any foundations, and therefore can be disregarded. I personally agree that life after death is impossible, and shall explain my reasoning within this essay. 

Firstly, Gilbert Ryle would agree that life after death is impossible, defining dualism as a “category mistake”. By this, he meant that philosophers who believe in the fundamental distinction between mind and matter are confusing two different logical types, and in actual fact mental and physical states are one and the same. He refers to the theory of the separation of the mind and body as the “dogma of the ghost in the machine”, explaining that there is no hidden entity (the ‘mind’) operating within our mechanical ‘body’, but instead our mental processes are simply a way of explaining our physical actions. For this reason, he adopts the monist approach that when our body dies, we die completely. There is nothing left of us to live on, and for this reason life after death must be impossible.

A very similar approach to this is the biological reductionism of Steven Pinker.  A cognitive scientist and psychologist, Pinker accepts the findings of modern neuroscience which proves that everything can be reduced to biological explanations. We may feel that we only act as a result of our mind willing us to do something, but in actual fact the explanation for every physical action can be seen to be sourced from the brain. Pinker highlights the fact that using structural MRI and PET scans, neuroscientists are able to see that “every form of mental activity gives off metabolic signals”, which then travel along neural pathways in the brain and stimulate physical activity as a response. Nothing about this requires any metaphysical or spiritual input, rendering any beliefs of a mind or soul completely unnecessary and hence illogical. Pinker states that “when the brain dies, the person goes out of existence”, thus we can conclude, with huge amounts of supporting scientific evidence, that life after death is indeed impossible.

On the other end of the spectrum, Descartes presents his theory of dualism, and from this claims that life after death is not only possible, but also certain. Unlike Ryle and Pinker, Descartes firmly believes that the mind and body are entirely separable and very different entities. Through his use of the a priori argument ‘cogito ergo sum’, Descartes suggests that we can even be more certain of the existence of our mind than our body, especially as we can witness the body dividing/decaying, but we “cannot understand a mind except as being indivisible.” Being heavily influenced by Platonic concepts, Descartes used this idea to develop a syllogism to supposedly prove the immortality of the soul. He stated that if something cannot be broken down into composite parts, it must be immortal. Therefore as the mind cannot be broken into composite parts, the mind must be immortal. This leads on to Descartes’ certainty in life after death. If the mind is immortal but the body is mortal, then the mind must live on beyond the death of a person’s body. Therefore some form of afterlife is logically necessary if one is to accept the previous premises of the Cartesian theory. However, I feel Descartes’ argument is particularly weak as while he does claim to prove the existence of the mind through a priori logic, he lacks any empirical evidence to support either that the mind does exist or that it is immortal. As stated earlier, science is instead able to support the claim that when a person’s body dies, they completely cease to exist. Using ‘Ockham’s razor’, it would be far more logical to accept this simple explanation than unnecessarily over-complicating the issue. 

However while Ryle and Descartes seem to lie on opposite ends of the spectrum concerning the possibility of life after death, there are several other philosophers who adopt less extreme dualist or monist views.
Hick, for example, is often considered a ‘soft materialist’, as while he argues in the direction of materialism, he also believes there is an afterlife, but one that is physical rather than spiritual. Rejecting the common Christian belief that a person’s soul is immortal and this is what is resurrected, Hick proposes that upon the death of our current bodies, a ‘replica’ of our body is made and placed in a special, separate place of existence. This ‘replica theory’ therefore accounts for life after death, while avoiding all the problems associated with dualism and body-soul interactions. While the theory seems to be largely a leap of faith, Hick states that we need the resurrection world in order to “fulfil the human potential”, which apparently “does not usually occur within the space of a single earthly life”. If our lives do continue in an ongoing “karmic wave” as stated by Hick, we will have much more time to realise and fulfil our God-given intention, a concept which is very compatible with the soul-making theodicy of Irenaeus. However, there are some very fundamental weaknesses of Hick’s theory. Firstly, by stating that we will immediately be replicated into another realm upon death, Hick seems to be ignoring the question of punishment or judgement. If we are all replicated, then we all have a chance to live again, no matter what sins we have committed in our past lives. Furthermore, Vardy raises issues with the continuity of Hick’s ‘replicas’. Despite the replica being physically identical and also thinking they are the same person, Vardy doesn’t think this sufficiently solves issues raised with personal identity. For example, if a copy of the Mona Lisa was made that was identical even at a molecular level, it is unlikely that this copy would be considered the exact same as the original, and equal in value.  The same could be said of people: just because a replica is physically the same, even with the same thoughts, it is still not the same person. By considering this fairly fatal flaw in Hick’s argument, it is easy to disregard his theory altogether, returning to the proposition that life after death is indeed impossible. Ockham’s razor could once again be used here, as if there is evidence to suggest that we cease to exist when we die, there is no need to add on unnecessary explanations, as the simplest explanation is most likely to be correct. 

Dawkins is another key scholar to consider when debating the possibility of life after death, however unlike Hick, Dawkins is much more in agreement with Ryle and Pinker than Descartes. While he agrees with the materialist view that there is no distinction or separation between the mind and soul, Dawkins does believe that there is some mental activity, but that this has come about through evolution. He states that everything can be explained through DNA and genes, and that rather than having a ‘soul’, every emotion and action we express is a result of evolutionary ‘consciousness’. For this reason, Dawkins does not quite fit into the biological reductionism of Pinker, as while he does state that everything we do is a result of our DNA, he thinks that we have evolved to develop some form of non-physical consciousness in order to benefit ourselves and in order to survive, a theme which he particularly emphasises in his book, ‘The Selfish Gene’. When describing the process by which animals developed consciousness, he stated that the good or bad results of a good or bad action will cause us to either repeat or stop doing the action, therefore enabling us to choose how to behave in the future. While people argue that this process still seems to be a conscious decision, and therefore does suggest the existence of the mind, Dawkins refutes this. His point was that we do not need any kind of spiritual input to train ourselves in this way, it is all as a result of biological processes, including the replication of DNA, that results in the evolution of our brain to know how to act. Therefore this is yet another successful rejection of the dualist distinction between the mind and body, thus also drawing the conclusion that life after death is impossible due to the lack of an immortal spiritual entity within us. 

In conclusion, while there have been several arguments claiming to prove the certainty of the afterlife, they are all based upon assumptions and clearly lack empirical evidence. On the contrary, science and valid logic have been utilised to support the more materialistic and monist end of the spectrum, making the arguments of Ryle, Pinker and Dawkins that life after death is impossible much more plausible. I find Pinker’s input into this discussion among the most valuable, as he puts forward clear scientific fact and “empirical discovery” that can certainly not be disputed. The fact that we are able to see the brain as an explanation for everything we do should enable us to completely disregard all theories concerning any aspects of the metaphysical world. As Ockham’s principle states, “entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity.” There is no need to fabricate theories on the soul when we have all the explanation we need, and therefore I strongly believe we should simply accept the scientific evidence and works of biological reductionists to prove once and for all that life after death is impossible. 


Mark/comment:

AO1: 19/21, AO2: 13/14

"Very well written. What comes through most is the confidence you have in the ability to select and deploy various scholarly views.
You've got the right balance between AO1 and AO2 - well done!"


Tuesday 6 May 2014

AS Ethics: Kantian + right to a child

a) Explain how a follower of Kantian ethics might approach issues surrounding the right to a child. (25)

Immanuel Kant put forward his theory of ethics, which is deontological and absolutist, meaning we must base moral decisions on the act alone, and in order to do good, we must fulfil our duty for duty's sake alone, regardless of the individual situation, and without an ulterior motive. Kant's theory is also synthetic a priori, as while he believes that morality is a priori, we must also use some synthetic knowledge to understand how to act morally. In order to fulfil our duty, Kant stated that we must follow both the good will and the categorical imperative, of which there are three formulations: the principle of universability, the principle of a kingdom of ends, and the principle of treating humans as ends in themselves. When considering issues surrounding rights to a child, followers of Kantian ethics would generally be against fertility treatments, as they seem to contradict the three aforementioned formulae of the categorical imperative. 

Some may be tempted to argue in favour of fertility treatments, as with good intention, allowing an infertile couple to have children seems to be doing the right thing and fulfilling your duty. However, while Kant agrees that good will is an important factor to consider, ethics should be deontological, therefore the most important factor is whether the action itself is objectively good, rather than looking at the situation. Therefore, it is necessary to refer to the categorical imperative to determine whether fertility treatment is a good action.

The first formulation is the Principle of Universability. Kant stated that we must "act in a way that actions might become a universal law", so here, the consistency of the action is also decisive. This means that while we may think an action seems good, it is only good if we could universally apply it to every situation and it would still be good. When looking at rights to a child, it is unlikely that this principle would justify any fertility treatments. For example, in vitro fertilisation (IVF) results in several 'spare' embryos being fertilised, which are then destroyed or disposed of if not needed. While initially it may seem moral to allow IVF to enable a couple to have a child, clearly it would not be moral if this was universalised, as there would be a huge number of embryos that would be killed, therefore this is not universally good.

The second principle of the categorical imperative is treating people as 'ends in themselves withal, not as means to an end'. This means we shoudl not use or manipulate people for an ulterior motive or to get what we want, but instead should treat people fairly, and as ends in themselves. Many fertility treatments go against this principle, so it forms another argument why followers of Kantian ethics would be against them. Treatments such as surrogacy and Artificial Insemination from a donor (AID) are not treating people as ends in themselves, as they both involve using a third party to help someone else have a baby, so attaining personal gain rather than the surrogate mother or donor being treated as ends in themselves. Therefore, followers of Kan t would not support these treatments.

The third and final formulation is the principle of the kingdom of ends. This states that we must all act as if we are a 'law-making member of the Kingdom of Ends', so while acting morally, we must also recognise that we are responsible for setting a good example to others. This is similar to the first principle in the way that when making a moral decision, we must consider whether it would still be right if everyone else in the world made the same decision. While fertility treatments may seem like the right thing to do in individual situations, it is unlikely that they would be justified as a universal rule. For example, in 1985, Kim Cotton was paid £6500 to have a baby for an infertile couple. While she may have been following the good will, with good intention to help, we must consider whether we would want to live in a society where it was acceptable to pay other people to have your children. Not only is this treating people as a means to an end, going against the second formulation, but it is also a contradiction of the law of nature, as reproduction/sex within a relationship or married couple would lose its value, as having children would no longer be seen as an intimate event within a relationship, but instead as something else which can be done with a third party. Therefore, again, followers of Kantian ethics would be against issues/treatments surrounding rights to a child.

Mark: 25/25

AS Philo: Aristotle + 4 causes

a) Explain Aristotle's understanding of the Four Causes. (25)

Aristotle took an empirical approach when considering the explanation of the universe, as unlike Plato, he believed that knowledge rests on careful observation. Aristotle observed that the world is in a constant state of flux, with things moving from a state of potentiality to actuality. In his book Metaphysics, he used the example of 'whiteness', as anything which is not white has the potential to become 'actually white'. This led Aristotle to believe not only in the Principle of Causation, but also that there were different stages to causation, which he called the Four Causes. These causes are, according to Aristotle, necessary to explain the existence of all objects within the world.

The first cause, known as the Material Cause, explains what the object is made from. Using the example of a table, wood would be its material cause.

The second cause is the Formal Cause, which refers to the object's characteristics. Aristotle refers to this as the 'form' of the object, which is immanent and unrelated to Plato's ideas of 'the forms'. The shape of the object makes it what it is, however it is clear that objects cannot simply be made from its materials into its shape - in order for wood to take the form of a table, there must be a tablemaker.

Therefore Aristotle devised the third cause, known as the Efficient Cause, which refers to what brings the object about. Aristotle used the example of a marble statue, and the efficient cause would be the chisel, hammer and sculptor, causing the marble to move from a state of potentiality to actuality. 

Lastly, Aristotle stated that all things have a Final Cause, referring to its purpose, or 'telos'. Aristotle believed that all things have a natural purpose which we must aim to fulfil, for example in Metaphysics he stated that the purpose of walking is 'that one may be healthy'.

While Aristotle did not believe in a theistic God, he put forward the concept of the 'Prime Mover'. This referred to a supreme and perfect being, that is the efficient and final cause of the universe. As the Prime Mover is responsible for things moving from a state of potentiality to actuality, it itself is in a state of 'pure actuality', and incapable of change.

Mark: 21/25

Monday 5 May 2014

AS Philo part a) Aquinas + Copleston's C.A

a) Explain Aquinas' cosmological argument and how Copleston developed it. (25)

In Summae Theologiae, Aquinas put forward his cosmological argument, based on inductive logic and a posteriori knowledge of the world. His argument was put forward in the 'five ways', which he stated are to help us understand God, rather than prove him, as ultimately God is an infinitely perfect being that we will never be able to truly comprehend.

The first way is based on motion and the principle of causation, which was largely influenced by Aristotle. Aquinas witnessed that everything is in a constant state of flux, which is a point drawn upon by many other philosophers, including Heraclitus' theory that 'we can never step in the same river twice'. However for Aquinas, motion is more about movement, but also the conversion of an object from a state of potentiality to actuality. He stated that 'whatever moves is moved by another', meaning that there must be something causing this motion within the world. However in order to be the cause of everything else's motion, the cause must be 'itself unmoved', similarly to Aristotle's concept of the Prime Mover. This cause of motion is, according to Aquinas, God.

The second way draws upon the observation that everything in the world appears to have a sequence of efficient causes which result in something's existence. This means that there are two possibilities regarding the chain of causes: either there is infinite regress, or there was one initial cause that is responsible for all others. Through inductive logic, Aquinas realised that it is impossible to have an infinite chain of causes, as 'without a first cause, there would be no subsequent causes'. Therefore, it is necessary for us to admit that there must have been one first cause, and this cause is God.

Thirdly, Aquinas observed that it is 'possible for things to be and not to be', meaning everything is contingent, as everything's existence relies upon something else. If everything in the world is contingent, then there must have been one point in time that there was nothing. If this is the case, then there would still be nothing. Therefore, there must be one necessary thing, that has always existed, and is responsible for bringing all contingent beings into existence, explaining how the universe exists now when the default position would otherwise be nothingness. Aquinas then states that this necessary being must be God.

Aquinas' 5 ways form the basis of the classical cosmological argument, and this was later developed by several other philosophers including Leibniz and Copleston. Instead of accepting the principle of causation - that every cause has an effect - Leibniz accepted Hume's criticism that this is not necessarily true, as we can imagine an effect with a cause. Instead, Leibniz put forward his theory of sufficient reason. This states that while not everything needs a cause, every effect must have had a sufficient reason for it to come into existence. 

Copleston further developed this, forming the modern cosmological argument. Copleston stated that while everything must have a sufficient reason, everything in this world is contingent, as everything relies upon something else. He used humans as an example, as we rely on air, food and water to exist. If nothing contains the reason for its own existence, then the sufficient reason for the universe must exist externally. He then draws the conclusion that this external reason must be God, which then forms another logical argument supporting the existence of God.

Mark: currently pending.

Sunday 4 May 2014

AS Ethics part b) religious ethics

b) 'A right ethical act is one approved by God.' Discuss. (10)

I've colour-coded, so my point of view is in blue, and the counter-argument is in red. Note how in each paragraph, I've sandwiched the counter-argument in between two of my points, to ensure my line of argument is sustained, pretty good structure to use!

The Divine Command Theory states that any action that God commands must be good because it is God's will and therefore approved by him. Many Christians accept this as an ethic, and blindly follow God's law. However I do not agree that it is a suitable ethic to be followed. 

Firstly, there will always be the question as to how we know what God's will is. Christianity states that God is a superior being that we will never be able to fully understand, therefore it is difficult to know what he intends for us to do and follow his commands without question. Some people may argue that this is one of the main concepts of the Divine Command Theory, as it involves fully trusting God and strengthens our faith in him and his laws, however this still fails to address the issue of how we are to know God's will for certain. This is a particularly prevalent issue when considering contemporary issues, such as IVF and abortion, which are not specifically mentioned in the Bible due to the difference in lifestyles and cultures between the time it was written and now. Therefore, it is difficult to follow the Bible or other Christian teachings for all situations, which suggests that perhaps God's commands should not be the only source of morality that we turn to when making ethical decisions.

Furthermore, the Divine Command Theory greatly restricts our free will, as it states that we should blindly follow God's instructions without using our own reason or sense of morality. On the other hand, some may say that our morality is God-given, therefore God possesses the ultimate morality and therefore anything he commands us to do must be good and right. Nevertheless, this contradicts Aquinas' theory of synderesis, and the idea that God gave us our own sense of morality n order for us to be able to use reason to make ethical decisions ourselves. This suggests that Divine Command Theory is not necessarily the best ethic, as for us to be truly good, we should be able to decide ourselves what the right ethical act is, and should not simply be following God's laws to the letter.

The Euthyphro Dilemma also disagrees with the above statement. In this argument, it states that if 'X is good because God commands it', then surely the meaning of 'goodness' is lost, as it is simply what God is commanding rather than humans choosing to do a good act of their own accord. Some people may argue against this, saying that God is good and omnibenevolent, therefore anything he commands will be good and a moral act will be anything be commands. However, this still raises the question regarding the definition of 'good' itself. If what God commands is automatically categorised as good, then good or bad is simply defined by the whims of God and is completely arbritrary. For this reason, the Divine Command Theory cannot be a good ethic to follow, as surely a good action should be determined by our own sense of morality and choice to follow what we feel is right, rather than blindly accepting and following divine authority.

In conclusion, although many religious people would agree that an ethical act is simply what God commands, there are also many arguments against this, stating that morality should come from our innate sense of right or wrong, allowing us to utilise our free will, rather than following the laws of divine authority without feeling the need to question them.

Mark: 10/10, comment: "PERFECTION." (Yes, my teacher really said this.)

AS Philo part b) teleo argument

I know people are having trouble with part b's, so here's a good example plan of a philosophy part B. I haven't written it out in full, but you get the idea, and I'll write it up in full when I have more time on my hands.

b) Evaluate whether the teleological argument stands up to criticism. (10)

I believe that the teleological argument does stand up to criticism.

First paragraph:
Point: Based on Natural Theology, we can observe order, purpose and regularity (OPR) in the world, therefore it is difficult to criticise the first premise of the teleological argument's logic.
Counter-point: The OPR in the world does not necessarily suggest there is a designer - Darwinism/evolution/natural selection shows that complexity can exist without a designer.
Counter-counter-point: Evolution could have been part of God's plan - God created a design with the potential to improve itself, therefore the design argument is still valid.

Second paragraph:
Point: One of Hume's criticisms is that the world is imperfect, therefore couldn't have been designed. However Aquinas/Paley never said that the world was perfect in their arguments, they just stated that OPR suggests a designer. 
Counter-point: Mill's criticism develops the idea of imperfections, states that evil in the world suggests that either there is an evil designer or no designer, and the latter option is more likely.
Counter-counter-point: There are other reasons for the existence of evil, for example God allowing us to have free will/be moral. There is still complexity, therefore this still points to there being a designer.

Conclusion: argument does stand up to criticism. Some strong criticisms put forward by Hume and Mill, but they do little to disprove the teleo argument.


Hope this helps!